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Doctor-patient differences in risk and time preferences: a field experiment 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We conduct a framed field experiment among patients and doctors to test whether the two 
groups have similar risk and time preferences. We elicit risk and time preferences using 
multiple price list tests and their adaptations to the healthcare context. Risk and time 
preferences are compared in terms of switching points in the tests and the structurally estimated 
behavioural parameters. We find that doctors and patients significantly differ in their time 
preferences: doctors discount future outcomes less heavily than patients. We find no evidence 
that doctors and patients systematically differ in their risk preferences in the healthcare domain. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The doctor-patient interaction is generally modelled as an agency relationship (Iizuka, 
2007; McGuire, 2000; Stavropoulou, 2012). Due to information asymmetry, the doctor acts as 
an agent making decisions on behalf of the patient. In a perfect agency model, doctors’ 
decisions should reflect patients’ preferences. In the case of health decisions patients’ risk 
preferences – the desire for taking a gamble - and time preferences – the degree to which the 
present is valued more than the future - are of particular interest (Gafni and Torrance 1984; 
Dolan and Gudex 1995; van der Pol and Cairns 2008; Bradford 2010; Van Der Pol 2011; 
Bradford et al. 2014; Cairns and Van der Pol 1997; Van Der Pol and Cairns 1999; van der Pol 
and Cairns 2001; van der Pol and Cairns 2002; Gurmankin et al. 2002). The agency relationship 
may not be perfect as doctors cannot easily observe or interpret patients’ preferences (Fagerlin 
et al., 2011; Say and Thomson, 2003; Ubel et al., 2011). If doctors make decisions on the basis 
of their own rather than patients’ preferences, it is important to understand whether the two 
parties have similar preferences for risk and time. 
The importance of risk and time preferences in medical decision-making has been 
extensively discussed in the medical literature. From screening tests (Edwards et al., 2006) and 
general practice (Edwards et al., 2005) to specialist visits for cardiovascular conditions 
(Waldron et al., 2010), almost every doctor-patient consultation involves a discussion of the 
trade-offs between risks and benefits of treatments over time before a treatment decision is 
made (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2004). Evidence suggests that doctors’ risk and time preferences 
affect treatment decisions (Allison et al., 1998; Fiscella et al., 2000; Franks et al., 2000; 
Holtgrave et al., 1991); and that patients’ risk and time preferences have an impact on the 
uptake of vaccinations, preventive care, and medical tests (Axon et al., 2009; Bradford, 2010; 
Bradford et al., 2010; Chapman and Coups, 1999; Picone et al., 2004) and on treatment 
adherence (Brandt and Dickinson, 2013; Chapman et al., 2001). This means that if doctors and 
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patients vary in terms of risk and time preferences and doctors cannot readily observe these 
differences, doctors may recommend treatments that are not optimal given patients’ risk and 
time preferences, which may result in lower treatment adherence. Treatment adherence is of 
major concern and has been shown to vary across individuals (WHO, 2003). Some of this 
variation may be due to differences in risk and time preferences between doctors and patients. 
Better matching of doctors to patients may therefore improve health outcomes through better 
treatment allocation and adherence.  
Although the medical literature provides broad evidence on the key role of doctor-
patient communication on healthcare decisions (Bjerrum et al., 2002; Dudley, 2001; Fagerlin 
et al., 2005a, 2005b, 2005c; Kipp et al., 2013; Ortendahl and Fries, 2006; Peele et al., 2005), 
there is little evidence on whether patients and their doctors have similar or different risk and 
time preferences. This gap in the evidence is largely due to the lack of primary data that directly 
measure, in a quantitatively comparable way, risk and time preferences across patients and 
doctors.  
Moreover, there is now broad evidence that risk and time preferences are largely 
domain-specific (Attema, 2012; Barseghyan et al., 2011; Blais and Weber, 2006; Bleichrodt et 
al., 1997; Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 2001; Butler et al., 2012; Cairns, 1994; Chapman, 1996; 
Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Cubitt and Read, 2007; Einav et al., 2010; Finucane et al., 2000; 
Galizzi et al., 2016; Hanoch et al., 2006; Hardisty and Weber, 2009; Hershey and Schoemaker, 
1980; Jackson et al., 1972; MacCrimmon and Wehrung, 1990; Prosser and Wittenberg, 2007; 
Viscusi and Evans, 1990; Weber et al., 2002). Even within the same health domain, preferences 
vary across different contexts (Harrison et al. 2005; van der Pol and Ruggeri 2008; Butler et 
al. 2012; Szrek et al. 2012; Bradford et al. 2014). It is possible, therefore, that doctors’ and 
patients’ healthcare decisions are explained not only by their risk and time preferences for 
monetary outcomes, but also (and perhaps more closely) by risk and time preferences for 
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healthcare outcomes. No secondary data, however, currently exist that directly elicit health-
related risk and time preferences for patients and doctors (Bradford, 2010). 
In this article we attempt to fill this gap by explicitly investigating whether patients and 
their matched doctors in natural clinical settings have similar risk and time preferences for 
healthcare outcomes. As a robustness check, we also measure risk and time preferences in a 
closely comparable financial context. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to 
systematically look at differences and similarities of risk and time preferences across doctors 
and patients in a real healthcare setting.  
We  conduct a ‘framed field experiment’ based on Harrison and List (2004) (an ‘extra-
lab’ experiment according to Charness et al., (2013b)). Field experiments are increasingly 
employed in exploring preferences (Andersen et al., 2014, 2008a, 2008b; Charness et al., 
2013a; Harrison et al., 2007; Sutter et al., 2011), and in comparing them across different groups 
of subjects (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Harrison et al., 2009; Masclet et al., 2009). In our field 
experiment we measure patients’ and doctors’ risk and time preferences by adapting the 
multiple price list (MPL) tests proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) and Tanaka et al., (2010), 
respectively, to the healthcare context (Galizzi et al., 2016). In order to address any issue that 
can potentially arise from framing and domain-specificity in preference elicitation, we also 
measure patients’ and doctors’ risk and time preferences using the same MPL tests but in a 
closely comparable financial context. 
We have three main results. First, there is a significant difference in time preferences 
between patients and their matched doctors, with doctors discounting future health gains and 
financial outcomes less heavily than patients. Second, we find no systematic difference in risk 
preferences in the healthcare domain between patients and doctors: in our sample both patients 
and their matched doctors are mildly, but significantly, risk averse. Third, doctors and patients 
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have significantly different risk preferences in the finance domain: while doctors are risk 
averse, patients are risk neutral. 
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief description of 
the methods while Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 discuss the main findings in the 
context of the literature, while the last section briefly concludes. 
 
2. METHODS 
2.1. Study Design 
We conducted a field experiment among patients and doctors in a university hospital in 
Athens (Laiko Hospital), Greece, in four waves between September 2010 and November 
2011.1 Patients were asked to complete a questionnaire (Online Appendix A1) while they were 
waiting in the outpatients’ clinics to see their doctors.  The questionnaire was completed in the 
presence of a research assistant who explained the questions and was available for assistance 
during the completion of the questionnaire.  The patients’ doctors were also invited to take part 
in the study by completing a similar questionnaire. The outpatient clinics were pathology, 
cardiology, gynaecology, haematology, surgery, endocrinology, orthopaedics, urology, 
gastroenterology, nephrology, rheumatology, ophthalmology, and otolaryngology. Patients 
who attend the outpatient clinics are seen by the first available doctor. They are therefore 
randomly assigned to their doctors. We obtained questionnaire data for 300 patients and 67 
doctors. Not all patients could be matched to the doctor they saw for two reasons. First, patients 
did not know beforehand which doctor they would see, and some patients refused to answer 
                                                 
1 Round 1 of data collection started in September 2010, lasted 5 weeks and included 91 patients. Round 2 started 
in January 2011, lasted 4 weeks and included 34 patients. Round 3 started in April 2011, lasted 5 weeks and 
included 56 patients. Round 4 started in October 2011, lasted 4 weeks and included 119 patients. It should be 
noted that the survey was conducted at a time of great economic crisis. The potential implications are discussed 
in detail in Galizzi et al. (2016).  
 7 
further questions when leaving the clinic. Second, some doctors did not complete the 
questionnaire. A total of 144 patients (48% of patients) could be matched to their doctors.   
The study was approved by the hospital’s Research Ethics Board on 6th of August 2010 
(protocol number ES 462).  
 
2.2. Questionnaire and Variables 
The questionnaire included a number of socio-demographic questions, such as the 
respondents’ age (Age), gender (Female), marital status (Married), education level (Educ), 
perception of their current financial situation (FinConstr), and whether they have children or 
not (Children). Patients were also asked about their health status, both by reporting their self-
assessed health (SAH) and whether or not they had a chronic condition (Chronic). A full 
description of the variables in the questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Risk Preferences 
Risk preferences were measured using an adaptation of the Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test to 
the healthcare context (Galizzi et al., 2016). The MPL method is one of the most widely used 
incentive-compatible tests in experimental economics to measure risk preferences for monetary 
outcomes (Charness et al., 2013a). Subjects are presented with a series of choices between two 
lotteries (A and B). The payoffs in the lotteries remain constant but the probability associated 
with each payoff changes. Lottery A is associated with a higher expected pay-off in the first 
few choices but this switches to lottery B in the later choices.  
 
Table 1: Adaptation of the Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test to measure risk preferences in the 
healthcare domain. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your Choice 
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 P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days 
in full 
health 
P Days in 
full 
health 
A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
 
The MPL was adapted by presenting the lotteries as different healthcare treatments with 
payoffs defined as days of full health (Table 1). A risk-neutral individual should switch from 
the ‘safe’ option (treatment A) to the ‘risky’ option (treatment B) only when the expected utility 
is greater in treatment B than in A. An individual who is risk neutral chooses treatment A in 
rows 1-4, before switching to B in row 5. A risk averse individual switches to treatment B after 
row 5, while a risk lover switches before row 5. Thus, the switching point is a measure of an 
individual’s risk preferences. We define SwitchRiskHP (SwitchRiskHD) a variable denoting the 
point at which a given patient (doctor) switched from lottery A to lottery B. This ranges from 
1 (switching to treatment B in the first row) to 10 (never switching to treatment B) and the 
higher the value, the more risk averse the patient (doctor) is. 
 
Time preferences 
Time preferences were measured using an adaptation of the Tanaka et al. (2010) MPL 
to the healthcare context. Subjects were presented with a series of six blocks of choices, each 
of which had five choices between two different healthcare treatments. Subjects were asked to 
consider their current health status and to choose between two possible hypothetical treatments, 
A and B, with different days of full health at different points in time (Table 2). In each block, 
treatment A gave a larger number of days in full health than treatment B. Treatment A, 
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however, was offered with some delay (so-called Larger-Later option, LL) while treatment B 
was always available immediately (so-called Smaller-Sooner option, SS). Treatment B offered 
progressively a larger number of days in full health. The time delay varied between blocks of 
lotteries from 1 week (blocks 1 and 4) to 1 month (blocks 2 and 5), to 3 months (blocks 3 and 
6).  We used switching points as simple measures of individual time preferences. The later 
individuals switch from treatment A to treatment B the more patient they are.  The variable 
SwitchTimeHPBi (SwitchTimeHDBi) denote the specific point at which a given patient (doctor) 
switched from option A to option B in the block of questions i. The values range from 1 to 6 
and the higher the value, the more patient the subject is. 
 
Table 2: Adaptation of the Tanaka et al (2010) test to measure time preferences in the healthcare 
domain. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your 
choice 
1.1  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 60 days in full health starting today A B 
1.2  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 120 days in full health starting today A B 
1.3  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 180 days in full health starting today A B 
1.4  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 240 days in full health starting today A B 
1.5  360 days in full health starting in 1 week 300 days in full health starting today A B 
2.1  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 60 days in full health starting today A B 
2.2  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 120 days in full health starting today A B 
2.3  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 180 days in full health starting today A B 
2.4  360 days in full health starting  in 1 month 240 days in full health starting today A B 
2.5  360 days in full health starting in 1 month 300 days in full health starting today A B 
3.1  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 60 days in full health starting today A B 
3.2  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 120 days in full health starting today A B 
3.3  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 180 days in full health starting today A B 
3.4  360 days in full health starting  in 3 months 240 days in full health starting today A B 
3.5  360 days in full health starting in 3 months 300 days in full health starting today A B 
4.1  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 150 days in full health starting today A B 
4.2  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 300 days in full health starting today A B 
4.3  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 450 days in full health starting today A B 
4.4  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 600 days in full health starting today A B 
4.5  900 days in full health starting in 1 week 750 days in full health starting today A B 
5.1  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 150 days in full health starting today A B 
5.2  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 300 days in full health starting today A B 
5.3  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 450 days in full starting health today A B 
5.4  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 600 days in full health starting today A B 
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5.5  900 days in full health starting in 1 month 750 days in full health starting today A B 
6.1  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 150 days in full health starting today A B 
6.2  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 300 days in full health starting today A B 
6.3  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 450 days in full health starting today A B 
6.4  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 600 days in full health starting today A B 
6.5  900 days in full health starting in 3 months 750 days in full health starting today A B 
 
 
 
2.3. Analysis 
We examine differences in risk and time preferences between patients and doctors using 
two measures for individual preferences. First, we examine switching points in the MPL tests 
as indicators of individual risk and time preferences. The higher the value of the SwitchRiskHP 
(SwitchRiskHD) variable, the more risk averse in healthcare a patient (doctor) is. Similarly, the 
higher the value of the SwitchTimeHPBi (SwitchTimeHDBi) variable the more patient in 
healthcare a patient (doctor) is. The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality rejects the null hypothesis 
that the switching points are normally distributed and we therefore test for differences in means 
between patients and doctors using the non-parametric (Wilcoxon) Mann-Whitney test. Even 
though doctors and patients may on average differ in their time and risk preferences, it could 
be the case that there is no difference in preferences in matched doctor-patient pairs and vice 
versa. It is therefore important to examine the difference in matched pairs as well as the 
difference in overall mean between doctors and patients. This is done by examining the number 
of patients who have identical or similar switching points to their doctors. We test for 
differences in switching points in matched pairs using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
ranks test.  As mentioned previously, 48% of patients can be matched to their doctor. Statistical 
tests (chi-square and t-tests) show that this sub-sample is similar to the whole sample in terms 
of socio-demographic characteristics.  
Second, we ‘structurally’ estimate the behavioural parameters within the utility 
functions. We separately estimate risk and time preferences following the empirical approaches 
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by Harrison and Rutström (2008), Andersen et al. (2010), and Tanaka et al. (2010).  We assume 
that the health-related risk preferences can be represented by a constant relative risk aversion 
(CRRA) utility function. The utility function of a subject in terms of healthcare payoffs x, is 
thus represented by 
𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑥𝑥1−𝑠𝑠
1−𝑠𝑠
         (1) 
where s is the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion in the healthcare context. Depending 
on the value of s a subject shows different degrees of risk aversion in the healthcare domain 
that can be grouped in three main types: 
1. if s=0 risk neutral 
2. if s>0 risk averse 
3. if s<0 risk seeking 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) methods were used to empirically estimate risk preferences 
(Harrison and Rutström (2008) and Andersen et al. (2010)). From equation (1) U(x) is the utility 
that a subject perceives from getting a healthcare benefit x. Under Expected Utility Theory, the 
expected utility by a subject of a given lottery j=A,B is the utility of each outcome k=1,2 in 
that lottery, weighted by the probability pk of the outcome: 
EUj = ∑k=1,2  pkj * U (xkj)          (2) 
with j=A,B and k=1,2. The expected utility depends on the subject’s risk aversion parameter s. 
Based on a candidate value of s a latent preference index Δ(EU) can be constructed. Our 
empirical model allows subjects in the outpatient clinics to make stochastic errors when 
comparing expected utilities. We include in our estimation a parameter μ to capture the 
stochastic error, so that the latent index is:  
∆(𝐸𝐸𝑈𝑈) = (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)1 𝜇𝜇�(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴)1 𝜇𝜇� +(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵)1 𝜇𝜇�                                (3) 
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When μ→0 the stochastic errors become negligible and the empirical specification reduces to 
a deterministic EUT choice, where the subject always chooses the lottery with higher perceived 
expected utility.  When, however, μ gets larger, μ→±∞, the choice between the two lotteries 
becomes essentially random, with the value of the latent index function approaching ½ for any 
values of the expected utilities.  We assume that the latent index Δ(EU) follows a logistic 
cumulative density function (CDF) taking values between 0 and 1, so that Λ(Δ(EU)) can be 
thought to link the latent preferences and the binary choices observed in the experiment (1): 
Prob (choosing lottery A) = Λ(Δ(EU))            (4) 
Under the assumptions of Expected Utility Theory and of CRRA utility functions, the 
likelihood of observing a specific choice depends on the individual risk preference s, given the 
logistic CDF linking the latent index to the observed choices. The individual log-likelihood of 
choosing either lottery in each of the observed choices Ci, in our experiment is given by:  
Ln L (s, μ; C) = ∑i ((ln Λ(Δ(EU))| Ci =1 ) + ((ln Λ(1 – Δ (EU))| Ci =0 )              (5) 
where Ci =1(0) denotes the choice of lottery A(B) in the proposed pair of lotteries i.  The ML 
was adjusted to allow the CRRA parameter s to be a linear function s = s0 + s1 D where D is a 
dummy variable taking value 1 for doctors and 0 for patients. 
For time preferences we follow the procedure by Tanaka et al. (2010) to estimate the 
shape of the discounting function for patients and doctors. Tanaka et al. (2010) use a general 
discounting model originally proposed by Benhabib et al. (2010) which allows to test 
exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic discounting as ‘nested’ cases of a more general 
discounting function. The discounting model assigns to a healthcare benefit y at time t>0 a 
value of  
𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽(1 − (1 − 𝜃𝜃)𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)1 (1−𝜃𝜃)⁄                       (6) 
 13 
(and a value y for immediate healthcare benefit at t=0). The three factors r, 𝛽𝛽, and 𝜃𝜃 identify 
the levels of baseline time discounting (r), present bias (𝛽𝛽), and hyperbolicity of the discounting 
function (𝜃𝜃), respectively. 
This general discounting model nests the three most common discounting specifications 
as special cases. In particular, when 𝛽𝛽 = 1 as 𝜃𝜃 → 1 the discounted value reduces to the 
conventional exponential discounting model in the limit, 𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (Samuelson, 1947; Koopmans, 
1960). When 𝛽𝛽 = 1 as 𝜃𝜃 = 2 the discounted value reduced to the ‘pure hyperbolic’ discounting 
model, ( 1
1+𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟
) (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).2 When, finally, 𝜃𝜃 → 1 and 𝛽𝛽 is a free parameter, 
then the discounted value reduces to the ‘quasi-hyperbolic’ or ‘present bias’ discounting model 
𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (Laibson, 1997; Phelps and Pollak, 1968).  
We denote the probability of choosing immediate reward of x over the delayed reward 
of y in t days by 𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥 > (𝑦𝑦, 𝑟𝑟)) and use a logistic function to describe this relationship (7): 
𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥 > (𝑦𝑦, 𝑟𝑟)� = 1
1+exp (−𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥−𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽(1−(1−𝜃𝜃)𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)1 1−𝜃𝜃⁄ ))    (7) 
where (𝑟𝑟,𝛽𝛽, 𝜃𝜃) are the above defined parameters, and 𝜇𝜇 is a response sensitivity or ‘noise’ 
parameter.  
A dummy variable for doctors is included in the models to examine whether parameters 
vary across doctors and patients. For example, for the ‘present bias’ model, we fit a logistic 
function (8) 
𝑃𝑃�𝑥𝑥 > (𝑦𝑦, 𝑟𝑟)� = 1
1+exp (−𝜇𝜇(𝑥𝑥−𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟))     (8) 
                                                 
2 The ‘hyperbolic’ model originally proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) actually takes the more general 
form   where the parameter h can be interpreted as a measure of ‘decreasing impatience’ (Attema et al., 2010; 
Bleichrodt et al., 2014; Prelec, 2004; Rohde, 2010). When h=0, the hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to 
exponential discounting. The higher is h, the more individual discounting deviates from constant discounting. The 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) general hyperbolic model nests further specific models such as the ‘power’ 
discounting model when h=1 (Harvey, 1995, 1986), and the ‘proportional’ discounting model when h=r (Mazur, 
1987), which is the ‘pure hyperbolic’ specification fitted in our estimations. 
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Where 𝛽𝛽 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐷𝐷, 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑟𝑟0 + 𝑟𝑟1𝐷𝐷, and D is a dummy variable taking value 1 for doctors and 
0 for patients. 
All estimates were obtained using an iterative nonlinear least square regression 
procedure with standard errors clustered at individual level, and a minimum number of 100 
iterations at 99 percent significance level. When initial values had to be specified in order to 
help convergence of estimations, multiple replications were performed using a range of 
different initial values.  
 
Robustness checks and further analysis 
Both the time and risk preference tasks were conducted from the perspective of the 
subject’s current health status. This raises two issues. First, the size of the health gain from the 
treatment varies across subjects depending on the level of their current health. The health gain 
is likely to be larger on average for patients compared to their doctors. Earlier empirical 
evidence suggests that individuals tend to be more risk averse for larger gains although this is 
now being debated (Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2005, 2002). If true, this may bias 
the results towards patients being more risk averse. The time preference literature suggests that 
individuals discount larger gains at a lower rate than smaller gains (Andersen et al., 2013; 
Benzion et al., 1989; Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Green et al., 1997; Kirby and MarakoviĆ, 
1996; Scholten and Read, 2010; Thaler, 1981). This may bias the results towards patients being 
more patient. To explore this we examine whether switching points are a function of self-
assessed health using both a chi-square test and a Pearson correlation coefficient. The estimated 
difference between doctors and patients is less likely to be biased by differences in health gains 
if there is no statistically significant relationship between self-assessed health and switching 
point. If there is a significant relationship the sign of the correlation will indicate the direction 
in which the results may be biased.   
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Secondly, the use of current health state raises the issue of satiation in subjects who are 
in full health. Individuals may express indifference (zero time preference and risk neutrality) 
in that case or not engage with the tasks. We explore this by replicating the analysis excluding 
subjects who reported to be in full health.   
To further test the robustness of our results, we also compare time and risk preferences 
between patients and doctors in the finance domain using the Tanaka et al. (2010) MPL test 
and the Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test (Online Appendix A2). In the financial domain, the 
size of the gain is the same across all subjects and none of the subjects will be satiated. Whilst 
time and risk preferences have been shown to be domain specific (Attema, 2012; Barseghyan 
et al., 2011; Blais and Weber, 2006; Bleichrodt et al., 1997; Bleichrodt and Johannesson, 2001; 
Butler et al., 2012; Cairns, 1994; Chapman, 1996; Chapman and Elstein, 1995; Cubitt and 
Read, 2007; Einav et al., 2010; Finucane et al., 2000; Galizzi et al., 2016; Hanoch et al., 2006; 
Hardisty and Weber, 2009; Hershey and Schoemaker, 1980; Jackson et al., 1972; MacCrimmon 
and Wehrung, 1990; Prosser and Wittenberg, 2007; Viscusi and Evans, 1990; Weber et al., 
2002), it could be argued that, if the domain effect is similar across patients and doctors, then 
the difference in preferences between doctors and patients should be similar across domains. 
Similar differences across the two domains would increase the confidence we can place on the 
healthcare results.   
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Summary Statistics  
The summary statistics for the two samples of patients and doctors are reported in Table 3.  
Due to missing values the sample size for estimating time and risk preferences varies from 241 
to 294 for patients and from 56 to 66 for doctors.  The four patients who switched back in the 
time preference tasks were omitted from the analysis.   
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
  Patients Doctors 
SwitchHRisk 281 5.06 2.57 0 10 58 5.03 2.05 1 10 
SwitchHTimeB1 273 4.39 1.93 1 6 63 4.88 1.69 1 6 
 SwitchHTimeB2 265 3.35 2.03 1 6 60 4.2 1.93 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB3 252 2.68 2.02 1 6 61 3.52 1.98 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB4 248 4.63 1.89 1 6 60 4.8 1.91 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB5 242 3.41 2.01 1 6 56 4.12 2.15 1 6 
SwitchHTimeB6 241 2.81 2.03 1 6 56 3.8 2.14 1 6 
SwitchFRisk 294 4.90 2.75 1 10 59 5.52 2.36 1 10 
SwitchFTimeB1 294 4.12 1.98 1 6 66 4.77 1.65 1 6 
 SwitchFTimeB2 293 3.05 1.88 1 6 65 4.36 1.62 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB3 292 2.43 1.77 1 6 66 3.64 1.77 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB4 291 4.67 1.87 1 6 65 5.14 1.39 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB5 290 3.71 1.97 1 6 66 4.44 1.63 1 6 
SwitchFTimeB6 289 2.69 1.83 1 6 66 3.57 1.81 1 6 
Age  238 39.61 12.93 18 74 61 36.59 8 27 63 
Female 300 0.48 0.50 0 1 67 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Educ 238 5.59 1.63 2 8                                   
Married 300 0.34 0.47 0 1 67 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Children 300 0.34 0.47 0 1 67 0.23 0.43 0 1 
FinConstr 232 2.45 0.74 1 4 60 2.03 0.66 1 3 
SAH 300 2.39 1.16 1 5 67 1.62 0.73 1 4 
Chronic 300 0.17 0.37 0 1      
 
The statistics show that, with the exceptions of income (and education) levels, age, and 
self-assessed health, doctors and patients in our sample have comparable socio-demographic 
characteristics. 
 
3.2. Switching points measures for risk and time preferences: differences between 
patients and doctors 
We start by examining differences in risk preferences. The mean switching point in the 
healthcare domain was SwitchHRiskP=5.06 (SD=2.57) for patients and SwitchHRiskD=5.03 
(SD=2.05) for doctors. The Mann-Whitney test failed to reject the null hypothesis that 
SwitchHRiskP=SwitchHRiskD (z=-0.332, p=0.7401), suggesting that health-related risk 
preferences are similar for doctors and patients.  
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The lack of significance of the chi-square test and the Pearson correlation (p=0.433 and 
p=0.0875 respectively) suggest that there is no significant relationship between risk 
preferences and self-assessed health. The potential difference in the size of the health gain 
between doctors and patients is therefore unlikely to have biased the comparison. To further 
test the robustness of the results we also compare risk preferences in the financial domain.  The 
mean switching point in the finance domain was SwitchFRiskP=4.90 (SD=2.75) for patients, 
while for the doctors it was SwitchFRiskD=5.52 (SD=2.36). The Mann-Whitney rejects the 
null hypothesis that SwitchFRiskP=SwitchFRiskD at a 95% significance level (z=-1.973, 
p=0.0485), suggesting a significant difference in the finance-related risk preferences between 
the two groups, with the doctors being more risk averse in finance than patients.  
In case of time preferences, a relatively large proportion of doctors and patients never 
switched from option A to option B, with the exact proportion varying per block of questions.  
In the healthcare domain the percentage of respondents never switching were 50% in the first 
block, 28% in the second, 19% in the third, 57% in the fourth block, 32% in the fifth and 25% 
in sixth block. Similar figures hold for the finance domain. 
Table 4 shows that in the healthcare the mean switching points for doctors are higher 
across all six blocks of pairwise choices, and the doctor-patient differences are significant in 
all cases but the fourth block. Note that the doctor-patient differences are only marginally 
significant in the first block. This suggests that doctors are more patient when discounting 
future health outcomes than patients, at least for time delays longer than a week. The 
significance of the chi-square test and the Pearson correlation suggest that there is a significant 
relationship between time preferences and self-assessed health (p-values for chi-square test 
range from 0.0001 to 0.1001 across the six blocks, and the p-values for the Pearson correlation 
range from 0.0000 to 0.0001). The correlation is negative suggesting that larger health gains 
(lower self-assessed health) are discounted at a higher rate. The difference in time preferences 
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may therefore be caused by the difference in current health status between doctors and patients. 
To explore this further we also compare time preferences in the financial domain. Table 4 
shows that the results for time preferences for money are very similar in that doctors are 
significantly more patient than their patients.   
 
Table 4: Differences in time preferences between doctors and patients 
 TimeB1 TimeB2 TimeB3 TimeB4  TimeB5 TimeB6 
Healthcare        
Number of patients 273 265 252 248 242 241 
Number of doctors 63 60 61 60 56 56 
Switching point mean patients 4.39 3.35 2.68 4.63 3.41 2.81 
Switching point mean doctors 4.88 4.2 3.52 4.8 4.1 3.80 
z statistic -1.911 -2.770 -2.940 -0.899 -2.249 -2.937 
p-value  0.0560 0.0056 0.0033 0.3685 0.0245 0.0033 
Finance        
Number of patients 294 293 292 291 290 289 
Number of doctors 66 65 66 65 66 66 
Switching point mean patients 4.12 3.06 2.43 4.67 3.71 2.69 
Switching point mean doctors 4.77 4.35 3.64 5.14 4.44 3.57 
z statistic -2.343 -4.941 -4.985 -1.457 -2.555 -3.558 
p-value  0.0191 0.0000 0.0000 0.1451 0.0106 0.0004 
Note: P-values refer to tests of the null hypothesis that switching points are not statistically significantly 
different across patients and doctors. 
 
Table 5 shows the difference in switching points between matched doctor-patient pairs. 
The proportion of patients who have identical time and risk preferences to their doctor ranges 
from 19.5% for risk preferences to 38.9% for time preferences (fourth block). Switching points 
are 2 or more apart from their doctors for around 50% of patients. The results of the Wilcoxon 
matched pairs test are in line with the results for the aggregate preferences. There are no 
differences in risk preferences but matched doctor-patients do differ in terms of their time 
preferences. That the results are similar is perhaps not surprising given that patients in our 
outpatient clinics were randomly assigned to a doctor.    
 
Table 5. Difference in switching point in matched doctor-patient pairs 
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 No difference Difference of 1 
point 
Difference of more 
than 1 point 
Wilcoxon 
matched pairs 
test 
 N % N % N % p-value 
SwitchHRisk 24 19.5 31 25.2 68 55.3 0.1074 
SwitchHTimeB1 43 33.6 17 13.3 68 53.1 0.0002 
SwitchHTimeB2 32 27.4 21 17.9 64 54.7 0.0000 
SwitchHTimeB3 38 35.2 14 13.0 56 51.9 0.0000 
SwitchHTimeB4 42 38.9 8 7.4 58 53.7 0.0036 
SwitchHTimeB5 34 34.3 13 13.1 52 52.5 0.0125 
SwitchHTimeB6 34 35.4 12 12.5 50 52.1 0.0000 
 
3.3. Structural estimation of risk and time preferences: differences between patients and 
doctors 
Table 6 shows the ML results which allow the fitted parameters to be a function of a 
doctor dummy variable, in order to estimate differences across the two types of respondents. 
The estimates for the two subsamples of doctors and patients are reported in Appendix B and 
are in line with the pooled results. The table also shows that the doctor dummy variable is not 
statistically significant in the estimates for the CRRA parameter in the healthcare domain, 
confirming that there are no systematic differences in risk preferences for healthcare outcomes 
across doctors and patients. The doctor dummy variable is also not significant in the estimates 
for the stochastic error μ, suggesting that doctors and patients are equally likely to make errors 
in their responses to the test. In the finance domain, the doctors’ dummy variable is 
significantly associated with both the CRRA and the noise coefficient: doctors are more risk 
averse in finance than patients, and also make less errors in their choices compared to patients.  
 
 
Table 6. Estimated risk aversion parameters under CRRA 
  Healthcare domain Finance domain 
     
s  0.1415*** 0.1211** 0.0432 -0.0135 
 (0.0470) (0.0522) (0.0535) (0.0578) 
sd -0.0138 0.0872 0.0253 0.3352*** 
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 (0.0322) (0.1092) (0.0315) (0.1173) 
     
Μ 30.8911*** 34.5442*** 52.3180*** 71.8444*** 
 (6.6939) (8.5517) (13.4195) (20.7522) 
μd  -14.8975  -59.5904*** 
  (12.0268)  (21.5227) 
Observations 3,051 3,051 3,177 3,177 
Log pseudo LL -1721.87 -1719.70 -1771.23 -1756.73 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Sample size in the healthcare domain is 3,051: 9 observations for 281 
patients and 58 doctors. Sample size in the financial domain is 3,177: 9 observations for 294 patients and 59 
doctors. 
 
As for time preferences, due to the relatively small number of observations for the doctors, we 
were unable to reliably fit the general discounting model. We therefore focus on the estimation 
of the three ‘nested’ discounting models: i) the ‘exponential’ model; ii) the ‘pure’ hyperbolic 
discounting model; and iii) the ‘quasi-hyperbolic’ or ‘present bias’ model.    Table 7 shows the 
results for the three different discounting models.3  In the healthcare domain, the estimated 
coefficient for the doctor dummy variable is negative and highly significant in both the 
‘exponential’ and the ‘pure hyperbolic’ model (-0.015, with SE=0.0036, and -0.0248 with 
SE=0.0064, respectively), suggesting that doctors are less impatient than patients. The 
estimated coefficient for the doctor dummy variable is also negative and highly significant in 
the finance domain (-0.0135, with SE=0.0025, in the ‘exponential’ model, and -0.0237, with 
SE=0.0047, in the ‘pure hyperbolic’ model).  In the ‘present bias’ model, the doctor dummy 
variable is negative and highly significant for the long-run discounting rates (-0.0159, with 
SE=0.0034, in the healthcare domain; and -0.0096, with SE=0.0020, in the finance domain), 
                                                 
3 Sample size in Table 7 differs across the healthcare and the finance domains due to different missing data in the 
different blocks of time preferences questions. In the healthcare domain, 273 patients and 63 doctors answered 
the first block of questions; 265 patients and 60 doctors answered the second block of questions; 252 patients and 
61 doctors answered the third block of questions; 248 patients and 60 doctors answered the fourth block of 
questions; 242 patients and 56 doctors answered the fifth block of questions; and 241 patients and 56 doctors 
answered the last block of questions. Since each block had five time preferences questions, this gives a total of 
9,385 responses in the healthcare domain. Similarly, in the financial domain, 294 patients and 66 doctors answered 
the first block of questions; 293 patients and 65 doctors answered the second block of questions; 292 patients and 
66 doctors answered the third block of questions; 291 patients and 65 doctors answered the fourth block of 
questions; 290 patients and 66 doctors answered the fifth block of questions; and 289 patients and 66 doctors 
answered the last block of questions. This gives a total of 10,715 responses in the finance domain. 
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but does not reach statistical significance for the present bias parameter (0.0144, with 
SE=0.1126, in the healthcare domain, and 0.1033, with SE=0.0813, in the finance domain). 
Estimates also confirm that doctors are generally less impatient than patients, and that, the 
present bias parameter is not significantly different from one. 
The goodness of fit of the estimated discounting models is relatively high with the 
adjusted R2 ranging from 0.5243 to 0.5301 in the healthcare domain, and from 0.5690 to 0.5706 
in the finance domain. The goodness of fit does not vary substantially across the different 
specifications within the same domain.  
 
Table 7. Estimated discounting parameters under exponential, hyperbolic, and quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting models 
 Healthcare domain Finance domain 
  Exponential Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic Exponential Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic 
μ  0.0037*** 0.0042*** 0.0035*** 0.0045*** 0.0051*** 0.0048*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
R 0.0215*** 0.0338*** 0.0231*** 0.0208*** 0.0339*** 0.0171*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0055) (0.0031) (0.0021) (0.004) (0.0017) 
B   1.0404***   0.8997*** 
   (0.0611)   (0.0813) 
rd -0.015*** -0.0248** -0.0159*** -0.0135*** -0.0237*** -0.0096*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0020) 
bd   0.0144   0.1033 
   (0.1126)   (0.0813) 
Observations 9,385 9,385 9,385 10,715 10,715 10,715 
Adj R-Squared 0.5300 0.5243 0.5301 0.5690 0.5706 0.5697 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Sample size differs across the healthcare and the finance domains due to 
different missing data in the different blocks of the time preferences questions. See footnote 4 for a detailed 
explanation.  
 
The above estimates of the risk and time preferences parameters and of the doctor-
patient dummy are robust to the introduction in the models of further covariates, such as gender, 
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age, financial state, and self-assessed health. Finally, similar results were found when 
excluding subjects who reported to be in full health suggesting that satiation might not have 
been an issue (results available upon request). 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
Our data suggests that there is no systematic difference in risk preferences in the 
healthcare domain between doctors and patients: both doctors and patients tend to be mildly 
risk averse in the healthcare domain. It could be argued that the lack of significant doctor-
patient differences in risk preferences in health is not due to a genuine similarity of the 
underlying risk preferences, but is partly an artefact of the differences in perceived health gains 
with doctors closer to being ‘satiated’ in health than patients.4 On average, doctors’ self-
reported health was higher than patients (1.62 compared to 2.39). However, we found no 
significant relationship between risk preferences and self-assessed health. This is in line with 
other studies which have questioned the earlier evidence that individuals tend to be more risk 
averse for larger (monetary) outcomes (Harrison et al., 2005; Holt and Laury, 2005, 2002). If 
the earlier evidence holds, this would imply that doctors would be more risk averse if presented 
with larger health gains. Therefore, the non-significant small difference in risk aversion in 
healthcare between patients and doctors found in our estimations may have resulted from an 
underestimation of risk aversion in doctors.   
                                                 
4 Note that we have opted for having the same framing across patients and doctors in order to not confound the 
findings with differences in the framing. An alternative experiment design could consist of presenting both doctors 
and patients with the same baseline hypothetical health status scenario. Given the non-observable differences in 
health status across patients, however, it would not be possible to elicit which health status (whether their own 
status or the hypothetical baseline status) was more salient in patients’ choices. It is plausible to presume that the 
most salient would be the most severe health status, implying that a patient with a cancer diagnosis would anchor 
her choices to her real health status, whereas a doctor in full health would be more likely to anchor his choices to 
the hypothetical baseline scenario.   
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The use of current health state as the reference point also raises the question as to how 
subjects in good health answered the questions as they were ‘satiated’ in their level of health. 
Around half of the doctors (51.25%) reported to be in very good health. However, excluding 
subjects who reported to be in very good health did not change the results. Given that all 
subjects gave reasonable and meaningful answers all throughout the tests, and that the estimates 
of the CRRA coefficient are consistent with non-satiation (e.g. Harrison and Rutstrom, 2008b, 
p.181), it may be the case that subjects who reported being in very good health used a reference 
health status worse than the self-reported health at the time they participated in the experiment. 
That is, subjects may have made sense of the scenario presented in a way more consistent with 
the life-time health losses they experienced or expected to experience. Therefore it is possible 
that their answers were implicitly anchored to a poorer health status than their reported self-
assessed health.  
We also compared risk preferences across doctors and patients in the financial domain 
as a further robustness check. In the financial domain, the size of the gain was the same across 
all subjects and none of the subjects were satiated.  However, it should be noted that doctors in 
our sample are generally on higher incomes than their patients, and income is known to be 
associated with risk preferences (Donkers et al., 2001). Doctors and patients did significantly 
differ in their risk preferences in the finance domain, with doctors being risk averse whilst 
patients are risk neutral. Moreover, the estimated CRRA coefficient for doctors in finance is 
higher than their CRRA coefficient in health (Appendix B), suggesting that the differences in 
risk preferences across doctors and patients may have been underestimated in the healthcare 
domain. An alternative explanation for the difference in risk preferences in the monetary 
domain is the difference in income levels.   
In case of time preferences, our evidence suggests that doctors are more patient than 
their patients when deciding over healthcare treatments with benefits at different points in time. 
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We do not find any support for present bias either in patients’ or in doctors’ time preferences 
for healthcare treatments. The above results are confirmed for the financial domain. We found 
a significant relationship between time preferences and self-assessed health with larger health 
gains being discounted at a higher rate. The difference in time preferences between doctors and 
patients may have therefore in part been caused by differences in the size of the health gain. 
However, we found a similar difference in time preferences between doctors and patients 
across the two domains.  
For the health domain, the lack of present bias is in line with other recent studies which, 
using different methods, also reject the quasi-hyperbolic model for time preferences in health 
(Bleichrodt et al., 2014), but it is in contrast with earlier evidence on quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting for health outcomes (Cairns and Van der Pol 1997; van der Pol and Cairns 2002).  
For the finance domain, our findings may seem unexpected given the widespread support in 
favour of quasi-hyperbolic discounting among behavioural economists (Ainslie, 1975; 
Angeletos et al., 2001; DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006; Diamond and Köszegi, 2003; 
Gruber and Köszegi, 2004, 2001; Kirby et al., 1999; Kirby and Maraković, 1995; Laibson, 
1997; Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; McClure et al., 2004; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 
Phelps and Pollak, 1968; Strotz, 1955; Thaler, 1981).  
A number of reasons can explain the differences in findings, including the hypothetical 
rewards, the elicitation method, the subject pool, and the study setting. More generally, some 
recent experimental results on time preferences over monetary outcomes suggest that the 
evidence on hyperbolic discounting is not unanimous. For instance, a number of recent studies 
have failed to support the hypothesis of non-constant discounting, including Andreoni and 
Sprenger (2012), Laury et al. (2012), and Andersen et al. (2014). Furthermore, a review of the 
literature by Andersen et al. (2014) notices that all evidence to date on non-constant discounting 
with monetary outcomes refers either to hypothetical surveys, or to studies with no incentive-
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compatible rewards, or to lab experiments with student subjects. None of the studies included 
in the review by Andersen et al. (2014) elicits hypothetical health- and finance-related time 
preferences from doctors and patients in real clinical settings.  
Our study adds to this evidence and, to the best of our knowledge, is the first study to 
suggest that patients and doctors in real clinical settings may not exhibit any significant present 
bias when making decisions on healthcare treatments over time. Given that quasi-hyperbolic 
discounting is associated to dynamic inconsistency, it is somehow reassuring to learn that, at 
least when it comes to healthcare decisions in real clinical settings, not only doctors but also 
patients exhibit time-consistent preferences. Similarly reassuring is the finding that there is no 
systematic difference in risk preferences between doctors and patients whey they make 
decisions over risky healthcare treatments. However, further evidence is needed to understand 
whether this is due to the specific healthcare domain, the clinical setting, the hypothetical 
nature of the decisions, or any other specific characteristics of our field study. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Preferences for risk and time are fundamental individual characteristics that have been 
found to be associated with numerous health and healthcare behaviours, including: heavy 
drinking (Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Bradford et al., 2014; Szrek et al., 2012), drink and 
driving (Sloan et al., 2014) smoking (Barsky et al., 1995; Bradford et al., 2014; Bradford, 2010; 
Burks et al., 2012; Dohmen et al., 2011; Goto et al., 2009), BMI (Borghans and Golsteyn, 2006; 
Chabris et al., 2008; Ikeda et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2013; Weller et al., 2008), poor nutritional 
quality (Galizzi and Miraldo, 2012); as well as overall self-assessed health (Van Der Pol, 2011), 
the uptake of vaccinations, preventive care, and medical tests (Axon et al., 2009; Bradford, 
2010; Bradford et al., 2010; Chapman and Coups, 1999; Picone et al., 2004) and adherence to 
treatments (Brandt and Dickinson, 2013; Chapman et al., 2001). 
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Surprisingly little attention has been paid to differences and similarities of risk and time 
preferences between doctors and their patients. These differences can potentially have a major 
impact on doctor-patient communication, healthcare decision-making, and treatment 
adherence. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first field experiment to examine 
differences in risk and time preferences between doctors and patients in real clinical settings. 
We have three main findings. First, there is a significant difference in time preferences 
across patients and their matched doctors, with doctors discounting future less heavily than 
patients. Second, we find no systematic difference in risk preferences in the healthcare context 
between patients and doctors: in our sample both patients and their matched doctors are mildly, 
but significantly, risk averse in the healthcare domain. Third, patients and doctors have 
significantly different risk preferences in the finance domain: while doctors are risk averse, 
patients are risk neutral. This raises the question whether the healthcare results were biased due 
to differences in the size of health gain. However, no relationship was found between risk 
preferences and self-assessed health.  
The findings have potential implications for health policy. In several healthcare 
contexts individuals are matched to their doctors and healthcare on characteristics such as 
gender and ethnicity (Cooper et al., 2003; Cooper-Patrick et al., 1999; Saha et al., 1999). A 
number of other interventions have been suggested to improve risk communication during the 
consultation with the aim of achieving better outcomes (Edwards et al., 2008; Fagerlin et al., 
2011). Our research contributes to this line of research suggesting that the doctor-patient 
matching and communication could be more systematically informed by a broader set of 
characteristics, such as individual preferences for risk and time. As agents to their patients, 
doctors, for instance, should attempt to find out more about their patients’ risk and time 
preferences when recommending specific healthcare treatments. Time and risk preferences are 
difficult to observe but are known to be associated with a number of more observable 
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characteristics such as age, gender and income.  One approach is therefore for the doctor to use 
these observable proxies of time and risk preferences to adjust their treatment 
recommendations.  Given the availability of short questions on self-reported time and risk 
attitudes, it may also be possible for the doctor to obtain proxy indicators of their patients’ 
preferences (Dohmen et al., 2011; Vischer et al., 2013).  Perhaps a more realistic scenario is to 
make doctors aware of potential differences in time and risk preferences between themselves 
and their patients and to recommend that they explicitly discuss the relative weights that 
patients place on the timing and the risk of treatments.  Shared decision making between 
doctors and patients has been found to associate with better health outcomes (Greenfield et al., 
1985).  
Our findings on time preferences suggest that doctors, aware that patients are 
discounting the future more heavily, should recommend treatments which reflect the higher 
weight placed on shorter term benefits.  However, it has also been suggested that individuals 
may consider their heavy discounting of the future to be undesirable, and that they may wish 
to overcome their impatience (Becker and Mulligan, 1997). If this is the case, then this raises 
the question whether there is a role for the agent (doctor) to help the patients overcome their 
impatience for receiving the benefits from treatment.   
The study is, of course, not without limitations. The experiments were conducted from 
the perspective of the participants’ current health status. Future research should explore 
whether results are sensitive to the differences in the size of health gain across doctors and 
patients. Due to the ethics constraints related to approaching patients in hospital clinics, we 
were unable to conduct experimental tests with real, incentive-compatible rewards in order to 
measure risk and time preferences in the healthcare domain. It is widely known that individual 
responses may change when real rewards are at stake (Andersen et al., 2014; Blackburn et al., 
1994; Cummings et al., 1997, 1995). In particular, in the finance domain, hypothetical tests are 
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known to elicit less risk averse preferences than incentive-compatible tests (Battalio et al., 
1990; Holt and Laury, 2002). The design and implementation of incentive-compatible tests to 
measure risk and time preferences in the health domain is a challenging but promising area 
where more work is needed. 
Another aspect which deserves explicit investigation is looking at the interaction 
between risk and time preferences in health. For monetary outcomes, risk and time preferences 
have been found to closely correlate and interlink (Ahlbrecht and Weber, 1997, 1997; 
Anderhub et al., 2001; Andersen et al., 2008b; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012; Chesson and 
Viscusi, 2000; Coble and Lusk, 2010; Epstein and Zin, 1989a, 1989b; Frederick et al., 2002; 
Kreps and Porteus, 1978, 1978; Laury et al., 2012; Noussair and Wu, 2006; Onay and Öncüler, 
2007; Stevenson, 1992, 1992; Weber and Chapman, 2005). The experimental economics 
literature has in fact developed ‘structural estimation’ models that jointly estimate risk and time 
preferences (Andersen et al., 2014, 2008b). A similar avenue is beyond the scope of the present 
study, but it can be usefully explored by the next generation of incentive-compatible tests for 
preferences in health. 
Furthermore, in our experiment doctors completed a questionnaire, which asked them 
about their own risk and time preferences, just like patients did. This is consistent with the fact 
that doctors’ own risk and time preferences have been shown to correlate with treatment 
decisions (Allison et al., 1998; Fiscella et al., 2000; Franks et al., 2000; Holtgrave et al., 1991). 
Doctors, moreover, may have different risk and time preferences regarding their own health 
from when they prescribe risky healthcare treatments to their patients (Atanasov et al., 2013; 
Beisswanger et al., 2003; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2014, 2012). This is an intriguing 
question, and similar patterns have in fact been documented in other doctor-patient interaction 
contexts, such as the choice of healthcare treatments in a consultation (Ubel et al., 2011). The 
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question, however, is beyond the direct scope of the present study, and is left for further 
research.  
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Appendix A: Description of variables 
Variable Variable description 
Explanatory variables 
Individual characteristics for patients and doctors  
Age Age in years 
Female Female gender (0=no, 1=yes) 
Educ* 
Level of education (1=primary school…8=doctoral or post-graduate 
specialization degree)  
FinConstr 
Constrained by my financial state (1=living comfortably…4=find it very 
difficult) 
Married Married (0=no, 1=yes) 
Children Having children (0=no, 1=yes) 
SAH Self-assessed health (1= very good…5=very bad) 
Chronic * Presence of a chronic condition (0=no, 1=yes) 
Risk variables  
SwitchRiskHP 
Patients’ risk aversion in healthcare implied by switching point in the test 
(1=extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
SwitchRiskHD 
Doctors’ risk aversion in healthcare implied by switching point in the test (1= 
extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
SwitchRiskFP 
Patients’ risk aversion in finance implied by switching point in the test (1= 
extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
SwitchRiskFD 
Doctors’ risk aversion in finance implied by switching point in the test (1= 
extremely risk seeking…10= extremely risk averse) 
  
Time variables  
SwitchTimeHPBi 
Patients’ time preference in healthcare implied by switching point in block 
i=1…6 (1=least patient…6=most patient) 
SwitchTimeHDBi 
Doctors’ time preference in healthcare implied by switching point in block 
i=1…6 (1=least patient…6=most patient) 
SwitchTimeFPBi 
Patients’ time preference in finance implied by switching point in block i=1…6  
(1=least patient…6=most patient) 
SwitchTimeFDBi 
Doctors’ time preference in finance implied by switching point in block i=1…6 
(1=least patient…6=most patient) 
  
*Information obtained only for patients. In order to be consultants in outpatient clinics, all doctors 
must have at least one post-graduate medical specialization.  
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Appendix B: Structural estimations for the two subsamples of doctors and patients. 
 
Table 1. Estimated risk aversion parameters in healthcare under CRRA for patients and doctors. 
 Healthcare domain Financial domain 
  Patients  Doctors Patients  Doctors 
s  0.1211** 0.2084** -0.0135 0.3217*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0966) (0.0578) (0.1027) 
Μ 34.5443*** 19.6467** 71.8446*** 12.2540** 
 (8.5544) (8.5086) (20.7588) (5.7425) 
Observations 2700 603 2700 603 
Log pseudo LL -1422.77 -296.93 -1450.75 -305.97 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 
Table 2. Estimated discounting parameters in the healthcare domain under exponential, hyperbolic, and 
quasi-hyperbolic discounting models. 
 Healthcare domain Financial domain 
  
Exponentia
l Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic 
Exponentia
l Hyperbolic 
Quasi-
hyperbolic 
2a. Patients       
μ  0.0036*** 0.0042*** 0.0035*** 0.0044*** 0.0052*** 0.0048*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
R 0.0215*** 0.0338*** 0.0233*** 0.0279*** 0.0465*** 0.0225*** 
 (0.0029) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0040) (0.0078) (0.0033) 
B   1.0445***   0.8829*** 
   (0.0635)   (0.0548) 
Observations 7605 7605 7605 4255 4255 4255 
Adj R-Squared 0.5525 0.5535 0.5525 0.6290 0.6293 0.6298 
2b. Doctors       
μ  0.0038*** 0.0039*** 0.0036*** 0.0055*** 0.0058*** 0.0057*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
R 0.0065*** 0.0087** 0.0071*** 0.0082*** 0.0115*** 0.0077*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0031) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0029) (0.0015) 
B   1.0426***   0.9685*** 
   (0.1016)   (0.0788) 
Observations 1780 1780 1780 1405 1405 1405 
Adj R-Squared 0.3878 0.3883 0.3880 0.4313 0.4321 0.4315 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.. 
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Online Appendix 
 
A1. Experimental instructions 
 
 
Dear Madam/Sir 
 
We would like to invite you to participate in a study asking your personal views on health 
and life in general. The survey consists of two parts. The first part takes place while 
waiting to see your doctor and takes 15 minutes to complete. The second part will be 
completed after you see your doctor and takes 5 minutes to answer. 
 
The study is conducted strictly for academic purposes and neither the Hospital nor the 
doctor have any involvement in it. All answers will remain completely anonymous and 
confidential.  
 
We appreciate your time and effort. 
 
Kind regards, 
The Research Team  
 
 
Q1.01 How is your health in general? Would you say it is… (please circle the appropriate box) 
 
Very 
Good 
Good Fair Bad Very bad (DA) 
 
 
Q1.02 Are you hampered in your daily activities in any way by any longstanding illness, or 
disability, infirmity or mental health problem? If yes, is that a lot or to some extent? (please 
circle the appropriate box) 
 
Yes, a lot Yes, to some 
extent 
No (DA) 
 
Q1.03 Do you smoke or did you ever smoke? (please circle the appropriate box) 
 
Smoke 
daily 
Smoke 
occasionally  
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
daily 
Do not smoke, 
used to smoke 
occasionally 
Never 
smoked 
(DA) 
 
 
Q1.04 If you smoke, how many cigarettes do you smoke on average a day?  
 (please indicate number of cigarettes in the box) 
 
 
Q1.05 How many units of alcohol do you drink a week? (a unit of alcohol corresponds to a 
small glass of wine, a medium glass of beer or a shot of 
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spirits). 
 
 
Q1.06 How many hours a week do you usually spend in moderate physical activities? Consider 
as a physical activity any moderate physical activity lasting for at least 40 consecutive minutes 
(such as walking, cleaning, gardening). 
 
Q1.07 How many hours a week do you usually spend in vigorous physical activities? Consider 
as a physical activity any vigorous physical activity lasting for at least 40 consecutive minutes 
(such as cycling, jogging, gym, step aerobics, swimming, football etc). 
 
 
Q1.08 Please indicate whether each of the following statements applies or not to your 
behaviour: (please tick the appropriate column) 
 Totally 
agree Agree 
It 
depends 
Do not 
agree 
Completely 
disagree 
a. I never make up a decision I will 
regret in the future      
b. I can never identify which 
choice is better for me 
     
c. Life is like a lottery. Being 
happy is just a matter of chance 
     
d. My forecasts are always correct 
     
 
 
Q1.09 Provide a percentage to answer each of the following questions: 
 Percentage 
(%) 
a. What percentage of people of your age have a better job than you,  
because they have better skills than you 
 
b. What percentage of your neighbours will better succeed in life when 
compared to you because of their better qualities with respect to yours 
 
c. What percentage of people of your age will have higher cash 
payments than yours for their better performance in their jobs?  
 
 
 
Q1.10 How I see myself (tick the appropriate column): 
 Strongly 
agree  
Agree 
Not 
sure 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
a. I am a daring person who generally 
takes risks.      
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b. I take initiative, pursuing opportunities 
even when they involve some risk.      
c. I am a cautious person who generally 
avoids risks. 
     
d. I always play it safe even if it means 
occasionally losing out on a good 
opportunity. 
     
 
 
Q1.11. Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative hypothetical 
lotteries, choose the lottery that you prefer between option A and option B. Lottery A will give 
you either 200 € or 160 € with some probabilities which change gradually in each row. Lottery 
B will give you either 385 € or 10 € again with some probabilities that change gradually in each 
row.  
 
For instance, in row 1, lottery A gives you 200 € with probability 10% and 160 € with 
probability 90%, while lottery B gives you 385 € with probability 10% and 10 € with 
probability 90%. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either 
A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal 
choices we are interested in.  
 
ID Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
 P € P € p € P € A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
 
 
Q1.12 Please, for each of the following rows, each containing a pair of alternative hypothetical 
options, choose the one that you prefer between option A and option B. Both options give you 
certain monetary payments. Payments in option A will be given at a later date, and payments 
in option B are given today. Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle 
around either A or B in the last columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s 
your personal choices we are interested in. 
 
ID Option A                  Option B Your choice 
1 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 60 € today A B 
2 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 120 € today A B 
3 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 180 € today A B 
4 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 240 € today A B 
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5 Receive 360 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
     
6 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 60 € today A B 
7 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 120 € today A B 
8 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 180 € today A B 
9 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 240 € today A B 
10 Receive 360 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
     
11 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 60 € today A B 
12 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 120 € today A B 
13 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 180 € today A B 
14 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 240 € today A B 
15 Receive 360 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
     
16 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 150 € today A B 
17 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 300 € today A B 
18 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 450 € today A B 
19 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 600 € today A B 
20 Receive 900 € in 1 week Receive 750 € today A B 
     
21 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 150 € today A B 
22 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 300 € today A B 
23 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 450 € today A B 
24 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 600 € today A B 
25 Receive 900 € in 1 month Receive 750 € today A B 
     
26 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 150 € today A B 
27 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 300 € today A B 
28 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 450 € today A B 
29 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 600 € today A B 
30 Receive 900 € in 3 months Receive 750 € today A B 
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Q1.13. Please think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you need to choose 
between two medical treatments, A and B. Each treatment has two possible outcomes in terms 
of how long the effect will last. You know the probabilities with which this will happen. 
Irrespective of which treatment you choose, for as long as their effect lasts you are in full health. 
When the effect of the treatment is gone, you go back to your initial state of health, i.e. 
the state you where before you started the treatment that is the same regardless of the 
treatment you chose, and no further treatment will be allowed. 
 
For instance, in row 1, treatment A will give you 200 days of full health with probability 10% 
or 160 days in full health with probability 90%. Treatment B gives you 385 days of full health 
with probability 10% or 10 days in full health with probability 90%.  
 
Please, make your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the last 
columns. Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we are 
interested in. 
 
 Treatment A Treatment B Your 
Choice 
 P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in full 
health 
P Days in 
full health 
  
1 10% 200 days 90% 160 days  10% 385 days  90% 10 days A B 
2 20% 200 days  80% 160 days  20% 385 days  80% 10 days A B 
3 30% 200 days  70% 160 days  30% 385 days  70% 10 days A B 
4 40% 200 days  60% 160 days  40% 385 days  60% 10 days A B 
5 50% 200 days  50% 160 days  50% 385 days  50% 10 days A B 
6 60% 200 days  40% 160 days  60% 385 days  40% 10 days A B 
7 70% 200 days  30% 160 days  70% 385 days  30% 10 days A B 
8 80% 200 days  20% 160 days  80% 385 days  20% 10 days A B 
9 90% 200 days  10% 160 days  90% 385 days  10% 10 days A B 
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Q1.14 Think of the following hypothetical scenarios. Suppose you currently suffer from a 
specific medical condition that has an impact on your health. You can choose between two 
medical treatments, A and B. Treatment A is available at a later date whilst treatment B is 
available today. When you start the treatment regardless of the starting date, its effects will last 
for the days stated in each option. For example, in the first choice, treatment A will give you 
full health for 360 days starting in one week’s time, and treatment B will give you 60 days of 
full health starting from today. At the end of the treatment you go back to your initial state, 
i.e. the state you were before you started the treatment, and no further treatment will be 
allowed. 
 
There are no other differences between the two treatments. Please, for each of the following 
rows, choose the option that you prefer between treatment A and treatment B. Please, make 
your choice for each row/pair, by putting a circle around either A or B in the last columns. 
Remember there are no right or wrong answers. It’s your personal choices we are interested in. 
 
ID Treatment A Treatment B Your 
choice 
1  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
2  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
3  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
180 days in full health  starting today A B 
4  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
5  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
6  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
7  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
8  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
9  360 days in full health starting  
in 1 month 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
10  360 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
11  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
60 days in full health starting today A B 
12  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
120 days in full health starting today A B 
13  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
180 days in full health starting today A B 
14  360 days in full health starting  
in 3 months 
240 days in full health starting today A B 
15  360 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
16  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
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17  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
18  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
19  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
20  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 week 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
21  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
22  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
23  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
450 days in full starting health today A B 
24  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
25  900 days in full health starting 
in 1 month 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
26  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
150 days in full health starting today A B 
27  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
300 days in full health starting today A B 
28  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
450 days in full health starting today A B 
29  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
600 days in full health starting today A B 
30  900 days in full health starting 
in 3 months 
750 days in full health starting today A B 
 
 
For statistical purposes we would like to ask you the following... 
 
Q1.15 What is your date of birth? 
 
 
Q1.16 What is you sex? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Male Female 
 
Q1.17 What is the highest level of education you have completed?   (please circle) 
a. Never been to school 
b. Primary School 
c. Junior High School 
d. High School 
e. Technical School 
f. Technical College 
g. University 
h. Post-Graduate studies 
i. (DA) 
Day Month Year 
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Q1.18 What is your marital status? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Single Married Divorced Widow (DA) 
 
Q1.19 Do you have children? (please circle as appropriate) 
 
Yes No (DA) 
 
Q1.20 Are you currently living alone? (please circle as appropriate) 
Yes No (DA) 
 
 
Q1.21 Which of the following descriptions comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays?  
Living comfortably on present income  
  Coping on present income  
Find it difficult on present income  
Finding it very difficult on present income  
(DK)/(DA)  
 
Q1.22 Thinking of your monthly personal income, is this: 
 
Less than 600 
Euros 
601- 1000 
Euros 
1001-1500 
Euros 
1501-2000 
Euros 
2000-3000 Euros More than 3000 
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A.2: Risk and time preferences tests in the monetary domain 
 
 
Table 8. The Holt and Laury (2002) MPL test to measure risk preferences in the finance domain. 
 
ID Lottery A Lottery B Your Choice 
 P € P € P € P € A B 
1 10% 200 90% 160 10% 385 90% 10 A B 
2 20% 200 80% 160 20% 385 80% 10 A B 
3 30% 200 70% 160 30% 385 70% 10 A B 
4 40% 200 60% 160 40% 385 60% 10 A B 
5 50% 200 50% 160 50% 385 50% 10 A B 
6 60% 200 40% 160 60% 385 40% 10 A B 
7 70% 200 30% 160 70% 385 30% 10 A B 
8 80% 200 20% 160 80% 385 20% 10 A B 
9 90% 200 10% 160 90% 385 10% 10 A B 
 
 
 
Table 9. The Tanaka et al (2010) test to measure time preferences in the finance domain. 
ID Option A                  Option B Your choice 
7.1 360 € in 1 week 60 € today A B 
7.2 360 € in 1 week 120 € today A B 
7.3 360 € in 1 week 180 € today A B 
7.4 360 € in 1 week 240 € today A B 
7.5 360 € in 1 week 300 € today A B 
8.1 360 € in 1 month 60 € today A B 
8.2 360 € in 1 month 120 € today A B 
8.3 360 € in 1 month 180 € today A B 
8.4 360 € in 1 month 240 € today A B 
8.5 360 € in 1 month 300 € today A B 
9.1 360 € in 3 months 60 € today A B 
9.2 360 € in 3 months 120 € today A B 
9.3 360 € in 3 months 180 € today A B 
9.4 360 € in 3 months 240 € today A B 
9.5 360 € in 3 months 300 € today A B 
10.1 900 € in 1 week 150 € today A B 
10.2 900 € in 1 week 300 € today A B 
10.3 900 € in 1 week 450 € today A B 
10.4 900 € in 1 week 600 € today A B 
10.5 900 € in 1 week 750 € today A B 
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11.1 900 € in 1 month 150 € today A B 
11.2 900 € in 1 month 300 € today A B 
11.3 900 € in 1 month 450 € today A B 
11.4 900 € in 1 month 600 € today A B 
11.5 900 € in 1 month 750 € today A B 
12.1 900 € in 3 months 150 € today A B 
12.2 900 € in 3 months 300 € today A B 
12.3 900 € in 3 months 450 € today A B 
12.4 900 € in 3 months 600 € today A B 
12.5 900 € in 3 months 750 € today A B 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
